by non-Japanese. In North and Latin America, where there were mi grant ethnic communities, non-Japanese believers in New Religions would increase steadily. This was a period when new migrants were few in number and assimilation ofjapanese communities into local societies proceeded apace. The situation in Taiwan and Korea was slightly different. The results of propagation in colonial times were not com pletely negated by defeat in the war. Churches run by local people car ried on religious activities independently of organizations within Japan. Expansion of membership, begun even in the 1950s, became conspicu ous in the 1960s and afterwards. And in the 1970s relations with the or ganizations in Japan tended to be restored, so that, with increased exchanges of personnel and the propping up of operations by organiza tions in Japan, the amount of energy put into propagation also in creased greatly.
The aim of this study is to consider the significance of this spread of New Religions to non-Japanese, so conspicuous from the 1960s on. At present Soka Gakkai and other groups have reached out to virtually every corner of the world through their missionary activity. The teach ings and thought of Japan's New Religions have been translated into many languages and have been accepted by people of widely different cultural backgrounds. What has made this situation possible is, first and foremost，the rapid improvement in Jap an 's economic strength; another factor has been the rapid growth in world communication and information distribution. The expansion of Japan's New Religions over seas is primarily the result of changes in economic life. This question of the influence of economic change on Japan's New Religions is itself a deeply interesting subject for study. The aim of this present study is, however, a little wider. The entrance of New Religions into foreign cul tures may even provide hints for thinking about what changes are at present occurring in religions around the world, and also about what special position Japan's New Religions occupy in the history of world religions.
Present Status o f Expansion
To what extent have Japan's New Religions spread among non-Japanese?3 As of 1990， non-Japanese believers in New Religions are decidedly most numerous in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia; next comes North America (including Hawaii). Brazil and Korea far exceed all other countries in membership, with the United States and Asian countries than 2% of Brazil's population of 150 million people are members of Japanese New Religions.
Those figures are, however, considerably exaggerated. N a k a m a k i Hirochika has said of PL that, as of 1984， "active believers are estimated to have peaked in the neighborhood of 30,000 people" （ 1989， p. 417); if this is true，then actual membership is about one-eighth that of the figure ^iven in Veja. O f course, it is difficult to say exactly w hat "active believers" means. In the case of Seicho no Ie, the official overseas mem bership is 1,257,907 (as of the end of 1989)， of whom roughly 1,200,000 are in Latin America. One of the most important religious practices in Seicho no Ie is subscription to their official publications; as of December 1989，608,000 copies of the two Portuguese-language publications, Acendedo and Pomba Branca, were printed. No data is available for exact numbers of copies of the Japanese-language publications printed in Brazil, but it is estimated that about 10% of BraziFs Japanese belong to Seicho no Ie ( M a t s u d a 1989) . O f the members of Shirohatokai 白鳩会[White dove society], the women's group, approximately three belong to the Portuguese section for every one who belongs to the Japanese section. Again, there were about 362,000 (as of December 1989) who were paying monthly dues to the Seishimeikai 聖使命会[Holy vocation society], while the same year there were 821,998 Seishimeikai members in Japan. When looking at these comparisons' however, one must take into account that Brazilians tend to feel it odd to pay mem bership fees to the religious group one believes in, so that canvassing among members of the seishimeikai is not done as aggressively as it is in Japan.
U N IT E D STATES OF AM ERICA
In the United States the NSA (Nichiren ShoshQ Soka Gakkai of Amer ica) far surpasses all others in its spread among non-Japanese. Accord ing to Soka Gakkai's own statistics, it had 333,000 adherents in North America as of 1985, very few of whom were Canadians. George W il l ia m s (1989) states th at the racial m akeup o f NSA m em bership in that year was 25.6% Asian, 47.9% white, 20.4% black, and 6.1% others. Since most of the Asians are of Japanese descent, roughly threefourths can be regarded as of non-Japanese descent.
Aside from NSA, it seems no other New Religion has succeeded in goinff from Japan and gaining several tens of thousands of adherents. There are some Japanese New Religions' however, that spread in the United States without initiatives from groups in Japan， such as the Reiki of Mikao Usui and Macrobiotic, founded by Sakurazawa Yukikazu and propagated in the U nited States by M ichio K ushi (see A lb a n e s e 1990).
East West Journal' w hich Macrobiotic started publishing in 1970，was printing close to 80,000 copies in 1985. Another New Religion, the Unification Church (Holy Spirit: Association for the Unification of World Christianity) founded in Korea, spread its forces to Japan and then to the United States, where at the end of the 1970s it claimed a m em bership o f approxim ately 30,000 (Inazaw a 1986， p. 60; B r o m le y and S h u p e 1981).
ASIA
In Korea the Soka Gakkai and Tenrikyo have made the greatest impact The former group maintains that it has 709,000 adherents in the Asia/Oceania area (as of 1985); we can safely assume that two-thirds of these are Koreans. Tenrikyo puts the number of its adherents at about 370,000 (see, for exam ple, T e n r ik y o D o y u s h a 1987， p. 146). Sim ilar figures are given in Korean government reports. Still, officials of the re ligious groups themselves consider actual figures to be far lower. One mark of deepening faith in Tenrikyo is participation in a three-month Hcharacter-building course" [shuyoka 修養科] at the group's headquarters in Japan. Because people could not travel freely from Korea to Japan, from 1973 several sites were set up in the country where these long training sessions could be carried out. As of April 1990， there were fiftyone churches scattered throughout Korea, with prospects for that num ber to increase. By February 1990 the total number of people who completed these courses came to 37,000.
In the rest of Asia, there has been a considerable growth among com munities of ethnic Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other countries. Soka Gakkai has enjoyed far and away the greatest suc cess overall, but in Hong Kong Shinjishumeikai 神慈秀明会 has been quite strong, and in Thailand Sekai Kyuseikyo claims over 60,000 ad herents.
This summarizes the countries and groups with the largest numbers of adherents, but I would like to conclude this section with a quick look at the range over which some of the groups have extended their prop agation activities overseas. Soka Gakkai and Seicho no Ie are the two groups with the largest number of overseas adherents, with the former's membership scattered all over the world and the latter's heavily concen trated in Brazil. In 1985 Soka Gakkai was estimated to have 1,262,000 members in 115 countries. Another wide-ranging group is Sukyo Ma hikari, with approximately 100,000 adherents spread over 75 countries.
Periods o f Expansion into Foreign Cultures

BRAZIL
Expansion into Brazil practically began with the first migrations o fja p anese in 1908. Groups of Honmon Butsuryushu 本門仏立宗 and Tenrikvo adherents were already formed by 1930. Seicho no Ie had also gained a considerable number of followers by the end of the war. But all of these members were restricted to Japanese ethnic communities. The one exception was Omoto, which from about 1930 had begun propaga tion; right from the start it reached out to non-Japanese (M ae y a m a and Sm it h 1983). B u t because o f stifflocal opposition, the dissolution o f ja p anese headquarters due to governm ent suppression, and the death o f missionaries, Omoto was unable to form a large group of adherents. At the end of the 1960s solid members numbered only a few hundred.
From the early 1960s large-scale penetration into non-Japanese soci ety began. The two groups that took the lead in this regard, PL and Sekai Kyuseikyo, had no bases in the migrant communities prior to this period. Tables 1 and 2 present the number of adherents by group and the proportion of Japanese to non-Japanese in 1967 as reported by M a e y a m a Takas hi (1983， pp. 192-93) . At this stage Japanese were still in the majority in the New Religions as a whole, though signs of the expansion to non-Japanese were already evident in Sekai Kyuseikyo in particular as well as in PL. From the end of the 1960s Seicho no Ie began an explosive penetration into non-Japanese society. And according to N a k a m a k i, by 1984 non-Japanese am ounted to m ore th an 90% o f total PL overseas membership (1989， p. 417) . Therefore, the rapid develop ment ofjapanese New Religions from the late 1960s was clearly a result of the spread of activities to non-Japanese. Missionary activity in the United States had an early start through the activities of such groups as Kurozumikyo in Hawaii, which has a history of immigration from Japan going back to 1868. From the late 1920s groups such as Tenrikyo and Konkokyo carried on organized propaga tion in Hawaii and California. They were followed later by Seicho no Ie, Tensho K6taijingiiky6 天照皇大神宮教， and several others. Propagation, however, was m ainly confined to people o fja p a n e se descent (In o u e et al. 1990， Y a n a g a w a and M o r i o k a 1979 and 1981， and I n o u e 1985) .
It was Sekai Kyuseikyo and PL that, as in Brazil, were the first to stress propagation to non-Japanese; they were unable, however, to achieve the same conspicuous penetration of non-Japanese society that they achieved in Brazil. The breakthrough in the United States was made by NSA. The first group of Soka Gakkai members was formed in 1960ノ At first the mainstays were women who had married American men and gone to live in America, and other people ofjapanese descent. As early as 1964 there were discussion meetings in English, the journal World Tri bune was being published, and other early efforts were being taken to penetrate non-Japanese society. In the latter half of the 1960s a remark able number of non-Japanese, especially white youths, joined the New Religions, even exceeding the number ofjapanese who joined. NSAs most surprising growth took place in the latter half of the 1960s, and the impetus continued on into the first half of the 1970s. Official adherent numbers are given as 200,000 in 1970， rising to 245,000 by 1975.
After that, however, NSA membership fell rapidly. 1990， p. 644) . This expansion of New Re ligions along with imperialistic expansion naturally aimed not only at Japanese but also at local inhabitants. And these New Religions were also accepted by non-Japanese (mainly Koreans) within Japan, people who either moved to Japan or were sent as conscript labor. Prior to 1945, therefore, penetration of New Religions into non-Japanese society was evident in many regions of East Asia. Nearly all of the fruits of imperialistic expansion were lost by defeat in World War II. Still, some remained, and Tenrikyo used some of its prewar propagation achievements to renew missionary activity in East Asia after the war. In fact, of all the New Religions that were active be fore the war, it was only Tenrikyo that had some oi its churches main tained by local inhabitants. O f the 51 churches it had in Korea as of April 1990， eight were churches that had been founded in the thirty-one years between 1912 and 1943. In Taiwan only one of its churches remained. Up to a certain point in time after the war, these churches all barely managed to survive despite violent anti-Japanese feelings, and it is easy to surmise that open propagation was not easy.6
Nevertheless, some brave souls proceeded to former colonial territo ries after the war in order to carry out missionary activity. The most representative of these is Choijae-Whan, who established the Won Nam Seong church in Pusan ( Y a m a m o t o 1982). Choi had come to Japan in 1927 at the age of sixteen and joined Tenrikyo in 1947 after suffering from Hansen's disease. Following some time in missionary activity among Koreans living in northern Kyushu and Hiroshima, he smug gled himself into Korea in 1955 and thereafter achieved spectacular re sults. By the time of his death in 1988, the Won Nam Seong church had given birth to seventeen other churches. Propagation continued after his death through the efforts of other Koreans living in Japan who returned to Korea. It is estimated that there are now more Tenrikyo adherents belonging to churches established by such repatriates than there are members belonging to churches from prewar days. We can safely con clude that Tenrikyo's membership expansion in postwar Korea went hand in hand with the development of Choi's Won Nam Seong church, and hence took place in the 1960s and 1970s. It would seem that Tenrikyo^ growth in Taiwan followed a similar timetable, with remark able growth occurring in the 1980s.
In contrast, the situation has been very different for Sekai Kyuseikyo in Thailand. Prior to 1970 there was almost no penetration by Japanese New Religions into Thailand. Sekai Kyuseikyo missionaries had taken up residence in Bangkok in 1968 and begun propagation, but up to the beginning of the 1980s there had been no great progress made. In early 1982，however, rapid growth finally began. By 1990 membership ex ceeded 60,000, and a yearly increase of over 10,000 members is ex pected. Tenrikyo also reports remarkable growth recently in Thailand.
At present I do not have available to me data on Soka Gakkai, which has had the biggest expansion in membership in Asia, so I am unable to say where and when its growth has been most notable. Judging from the above data on Tenrikyo and Seicho no Ie, however, we could conclude that the expansion ofjapanese New Religions into Asian cultures began with notable progress in Korea, then spread among ethnic Chinese com munities, and more recently into Thailand and other countries.
Conditions in Receiving Societies
Why is it that Japanese New Religions succeeded in penetrating foreign cultures at this time? It is a belief of most of the New Religion groups that each member of the human race has dignity as a human being, but existence involves suffering, and for this very reason human beings are in need of salvation. Hence they have a strong desire to extend, if pos sible, their teaching to people of other cultures as well. Besides, New Re ligions are in general extremely keen to expand membership, and not only out of a desire to save people. In a capitalistic competitive society， one's legitimacy is graphically brought home on the basis of success in expanding numbers. What is more, when the following of one's teach ing by people of other cultures is felt to be proof of your religion's uni versal adequacy， missionary activity to people of other cultures overseas can stir up stronger impulses than propagation among one's compatriots.
Still, sometimes propagation does not produce great results, regard less of how strong the desires or how much energy is poured into it. For propagation to succeed, suitable conditions must exist in the receiving society. Also, the religion doing the propagation must have, along with the strong desires, certain features making it easily acceptable by people of foreign cultures. In other words, by considering the special features of both the receiving society and the religion being propagated, we shall be better prepared to understand why, in a certain place at a certain time, particular religions succeeded in expanding. In this section, we shall first consider the special features of the receiving societies.
The first condition for expansion is the cultural and political condi tion, i.e., how generally tolerant the local government and inhabitants are toward a religion derived from another culture， and how favorable and friendly they are toward that culture, especially a Japanese, Orien tal culture. In the period of imperialistic expansion, the fact that the re ligion belonged to the culture of the side exerting authoritative control was in itself a major cause for expansion. Colonial authority is keen to surround local inhabitants with influences of that authority's own cul ture. This is especially true when assimilation is deliberately pursued. Under such a political, legal, and military aegis, propagation has an ex tremely high chance of success.
Yet the postwar expansion of the New Religions did not take place under this kind of powerful political aegis. On the contrary, by being dif ferent from the existing, dominant religions, in many cases they had to expand by overcoming governmental regulation and the opposition of local inhabitants. Also， success would be difficult if the religion were too exotic for the dominant culture, thus becoming an object of antipathy. This is the condition I am referring to when I talk about a degree of po litical and cultural freedom and tolerance. When the Japanese commu nity has excellent relations with the outside world, as in Brazil, Japanese culture in general naturally enjoys a good reputation. Economic expan sion through the export of goods and capital and personnel exchanges, even if they invite antipathy at first, eventually serve to make people feel attracted to the new culture, and they soften people's antipathies.
But it is even more important that cultural freedom be expanded widely in that society and that the authority of the traditional cultural system be seen as relative. In a society where the traditional religion has monopolistic authority-where freedom of religion is not recognized-one cannot expect success in propagation. Progress in industrialization and urbanization, along with progress in worldwide interchange of person nel and information, are eroding these cultural and political barriers.
In both Brazil and Korea in the 1960s and 1970s， when there was so much expansion of the Japanese New Religions, the countries were in the midst of development through rapid industrialization under authori tarian military-rule systems; it was not a coincidence that both military rules were as a result in a process of breaking down. Thailand in the 1980s， too， was in a state of rapid industrialization and cultural liberal ization and relativization. In both Brazil and Thailand, prior to those changes, there was little scope for tolerance of any other religions be sides Christianity or Theravada Buddhism. Even in the case of Korea, which had religious diversity, political regulation was strict. Industrial ization brought change in its wake, however. Industrialization requires free accumulation and investment of capital, the formation of a compe tent middle class， and the creation of a free labor force. For these ends, even though doing so carries the risk of a certain amount of social un rest, it is necessary to recognize freedom of belief and thought. Also, the liberation of people from traditional ways of life linked with the domi nant religions must, if anything, be encouraged. Added to this process of liberalization that follows industrialization are the waves of worldwide information exchange and cultural relativization.
In Korea there was fierce opposition from the inhabitants towards Japanese culture. Yet the expansion of general cultural freedom and the increase in everyday contacts with things Japanese as a result of eco nomic expansion to some extent softened the opposition to Japanese culture on the level of everyday life. In the case of the United States, de spite the outward facade of freedom of thought and belief, there always existed a strong confidence in the superiority of Christian, Occidental culture, with a corresponding rejection of Oriental culture. This rejec tion mechanism, and people's confidence in Christian Occidental cul ture, began to be badly shaken in the 1960s, a tendency that has continued to the present day. One of the striking manifestations of this unrest is the counterculture movement revolving around young middle-class whites. To sum up what happened in Brazil, Korea, and the United States of America in the 1960s and in Thailand in the 1980s: greater expansion of capitalism than ever before; advances in communication, transporta tion, information exchange, and the concomitant relativization of cul ture. In Japan, driven by a desire to catch up with and surpass Western nations, political leaders were quick to try to build a strong nation by ag gressive introduction of Western culture, and they were ruthless in de stroying the authority of traditional religions such as Confucianism and Buddhism. Defeat in World War I I and the Allied occupation added fur ther impetus in this direction. What emerged and developed from that experience of cultural relativization were Japan's New Religions; they not only emerged under these conditions, they also offered people many cultural resources for coping with these new conditions. O n the other hand, countries like Brazil and the United States had absorbed immi grants from all parts of the world, and as a result were more accustomed to cultural diversity than Europe; consequently， they had a tendency to prefer a pragmatic way of thinking that did not insist upon a single tra dition.7 There can be no doubt that in these countries the essential pre requisite of familiarity with cultural diversity encouraged openness to and acceptance ofjapanese New Religions.
The second condition for expansion is the emergence of a demand for new religions as a result of socio-economic changes. The various New Religions in Japan grew and developed by satisfying the new spiritual yearnings of people living in the midst of m odern Ja p a n 's socio economic changes. One of the common characteristics of the New Reli gions is their response to strongly felt needs of individuals in their daily lives, their solutions to discord in interpersonal relations, their practical teaching that offers concrete solutions for carrying on a stable social life, and their provision, to individuals who have been cut off from tradi tional communities, of a place for group activities where congenial company and a spirit of mutual support can be found. As capitalistic in dustrialization and urbanization advance, large numbers of individuals are thrown into new living environments, thus producing conditions that require spiritual support for the individual. Many people have lost the support of their traditional communities and face a situation in which they must get by on their own resources in the midst of the pres sures of competition and the dangers of isolation. Those who have over come such problems no doubt make up the lion's share of the stable middle-class urban population (including the lower stratum of middleclass laborers). Japanese New Religions are abundantly equipped with cultural resources that answer the needs of just these people in the pro cess of treading the path towards the urban middle class. The second condition for expansion, therefore, is the existence of socio-economic conditions that nurture a latent demand among people for a religion that gives guidance in daily life.
In Brazil and Korea from the 1960s, and in Thailand in the 1980s, such socio-economic conditions did in fact exist Let us take a brief look at Brazil.8 Brazil, whose principal industry was a monocultural agri culture based mostly on coffee， began to tread the path of industrializa tion in 1934， with the "Vargas Revolution." Amidst the trade slump that accompanied worldwide depression, and backed by the military, the new government forced through the domestic production of many industrial products that had been previously imported. This policy of industrial ization imposed from above was to bear fruit in the 1960s, after a period 7 For a consideration of these features of Brazilian culture and their relationship to fea tures of the religions situation, with a comparison with the United States and Japan, see Nakamaki 1986, pp. 204-28. 8 For the following summary I have relied upon Yamada 1986 and H orisaka 1987. of democratization following World War II. The military rule that began in 1964 would prove to be a period of large-scale development and high growth. The result was a rapid increase in population coupled with a rapid decrease in the rural population, which had once constituted the greater portion of the nation's population. Between 1940 and 1980 Brazil's total population grew 2.8 times larger, and the ratio of urban to rural population reversed itself from 3:7 to 7:3 ( N a k a m a k i 1989，pp.  421-22 ). Whereas 54% of workers were engaged in primary industries in 1960， in 1970 this figure was down to 44.3%, and in 1980 down even further, to 29.3%. The rapid economic growth that drew attention to Brazil as one of the Newly Industrialized Countries ( n ic s ) took place from 1968 to 1973， exactly the same time that Seicho no Ie's expansion to foreign cultures was being energetically promoted.
During the course of such industrialization and urbanization the Jap anese community occupied a singular position. Japanese immigrants very early purchased small plots of farmland (as compared to the huge plantation-type farms that were the mainstay of Brazilian agriculture) and set out to produce on self-managed farms commodity crops for sale to urban residents. While accumulating wealth through their character istic industriousness, the majority of people ofjapanese descent were extremely keen on giving their children a good education. As a result Japanese were quick to improve their status to that of the urban middle class when the industrialization and urbanization of Brazilian society came about. Japanese stood for the dream of the new industrialized so ciety: individual success through self-reliant effort. From the 1960s on, Japanese New Religions took over this idea of individual success, and in addition presented themselves to Brazilian society as the religions of these urban middle-class Japanese, religions that were eager to form congenial communities, that were deserving of respect and affection.
In respect to socio-economic conditions the situation in the United States of America was somewhat different. There, propagation of the Japanese New Religions succeeded in a society where industrialization had already reached a certain stage and society was about to move into a post-industrial period. In the United States of the 1960s there was also a large number of inhabitants who had left rural areas for the big cities, from the South and Midwest as well as from Central and South America, Korea, and other places. Yet it was not necessarily such people that the NSA attracted in its growth period. Rather, it attracted urban residents isolated in an advanced industrial society, represented most often by young whites in California and in large eastern-seaboard cities such as New York ( W i l l i a m s 1989). Offering a pragmatic value system, a con genial community, and an alternative to the individualistic, rationalistic Western civilization became the role of the Japanese New Religions in this country. NSA, Sekai Kyuseikyo, and Macrobiotic were accepted because they belonged to a group of New Religions that were countercultural, in that they counteracted the existing Christian, utilitarian cul ture (see I n o u e 1985, Y a m a d a 1983, and A l b a n e s e 1990).
Some of the Japanese New Religions responded to the fact that it was possible to retain their vigor within a post-industrial environment as well as within an industrial one. Most o fjap an 's New Religions devel oped in response to the religious needs of lower-class inhabitants who had left rural areas for urban areas with the advent of industrialization ( S u z u k i 1970). Still, between these nuclei of the New Religions in their growth periods and upper middle-class people with a higher education there was not a great cultural gap. When in the course of time the living standards of the Japanese people improved overall， the number of welleducated people who joined the New Religions also increased. As a re sult, the cultural resources of the teachings and group management skills that members of the New Religions had nurtured so long were available in sufficient amounts to enable those religions to meet the needs of urban middle-class residents isolated in post-industrial society. This phenomenon can be compared with the way the Pentecostal move ment, which began in the United States at the beginning of this century as a movement among the lower middle class, developed from the 1960s into a movement that involved the whole middle class, including those with a higher education ( S h i m a z o n o 1989a and 1991a).
In this way, though there are differences in the socio-economic con ditions forming the background to the New Religions' expansion into the United States and other places, still, if taken as the formative process of an urban culture common to cities worldwide in the wake of interna tional capitalism, the phenomenon can surely be seen as the product of one and the same socio-economic condition.9 In other words, the New Religions gained the support of urban residents by offering in the midst of worldwide urbanization the support of congenial communities and cultural resources that deal with things in a practical, realistic way and preserve stable identities in the midst of diverse human relationships.
The Features of Expanding New Religions and Their Appeal
The preceding section outlined the way New Religions as a whole might appeal to inhabitants of a society accepting them, showing the con nections with cultural and political conditions and with socio-economic conditions. In this section I would like to consider the way those New Religions that were accepted appealed to local inhabitants. First, I will note which specific groups expanded successfully into foreign cultures and then consider their particular features.
Though there are hundreds of New Religions in Japan, only a few have garnered a sizable following in foreign fields. Representative of the successful groups are Soka Gakkai, Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyuseikyo, PL, and Sukyo Mahikari. While Tenrikyo has been successful in Korea and Taiwan, it has not produced notable results in other regions. Two groups representative of New Religions whose expansion into foreign cultures has been relatively unsuccessful despite the size of their membership within Japan would be Rissho Koseikai and Shinnyoen. Lack of success overseas, however, is also greatly affected by accidental circumstances. For example, Seicho no Ie in Brazil was accepted as a religion offering the wartime and postwar Japanese community support for their identity as Japanese. When the Japanese community built up a large foothold in Brazilian society, a foundation for expansion was available to Seicho no Ie without any extra effort on its part.10
It is still possible to say that religions that succeed in expansion into other cultures have some inherent features making them deserving of that success. For example, Soka Gakkai's spirit of aggressive, argumen tative proselytization of complete strangers is easily surmised to be effective in circumstances where isolation in urban society has increased and diverse cultures coexist and clash with one another. Here I do not intend, however, to go into the self-evident factor of aggressive prosely tization; what I want to do is consider what aspects in the contents of the teachings and beliefs are suited to expansion into foreign cultures.
ST RAIGH T FORW ARD MAGICAL PRACTICE
Soka Gakkai, Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyuseikyo, PL, and Sukyo Mahikari are, all of them, groups in which straightforward magical practice forms the essence (or at least is one of the things forming the essence) of reli gious life. In Soka Gakkai, performing gongyd 勤行 and reciting the daimoku before the gohonzon; in Seicho no Ie, performing the simple meditation of shinsokan 神想観 and intonation of the sacred scriptures 聖経読誦 for the spirits of the ancestors; in Sekai Kyuseikyo and Sukyo Mahikari, pouring the deity's "light" into the body through the out-】 o SeichO n o Ie H o n b u 1980, Maeyama 1983 Maeyama , and M atsuda 1988 Maeyama , 1989 . S tark and Rob e r t s (1982， pp. 53-68) point out that sometimes a new religions movement that began in a large-scale society is forced to remain a minor movement there, and so early hopes wither and die, but when it shifts to a small-scale society it reaps unexpected success -that is, supported by many influential members at first, it develops into a powerful, prestigious religion in that small society .The assumption that another religion might have reaped the greatest success in Brazil if it had become the most influential in the Japanese community, cannot be completely groundless.
stretched palm (called)行 rei 浄霊 and okiyome お浄め） ；a n d in PL, praying to have one's problems transferred to the instructor together with a vow by means of the oyashikm 祖遂断一these are the main, or some of the main, religious practices. The belief that such magical practices pro duce mysterious, miraculous effects needs no explaining, one merely observes the practice and one understands it at once. And one can try it for oneself and see that it works. When this belief is transmitted to peo ple of another culture, it is attended by almost no difficulties in commu nication. That is because it is something in the physical, experiential sphere, which needs little meaningful articulation on the linguistic level.
Similar types of religious groups did not just happen to form by chance. Except for Sukyo Mahikari, which can be considered an off shoot of Sekai Kyuseikyo, all these groups were founded between 1910 and 1930 by intellectually gifted founders with large cities for their bases. In the context of the clashes of diverse value systems and the relativization of traditional culture, both keenly experienced in large cit ies, they all intended to present straightforward magic as the foundation for unswerving faith, and by this means overcome relativism.11 The ex pansion into foreign cultures of those religious groups was advanced with the intention of transcending the relativization of culture in places where such relativization was on the increase.
PRACTICAL LIFE ETHICS
N a k a m a k i (1989) has made a very interesting study o f the reasons for PL's success in Brazil. One of the things about PL that is appealing is the belief in miracles based on the magical prayer referred to as the oyashikiri. Still, merely a miracle belief based on magical practice is not enough to take hold of large numbers of people. The reason why people make an effort to follow PL over a long period of time is, he says, the appeal of its ethical teachings and guidance. Its ethics are adapted to the concrete situations of daily life. It preaches the mutual support of equal partners in a nuclear, rather than a patriarchal, family; a work ethic that includes not only honesty and industry but also working for society and for one's neighbors, and regards work as a form of self-expression; and an ethic of "citizenship" that encourages service to the local community. Furthermore, through one-to-one counseling it provides concrete, practical guidelines. All these things were, he says, lacking in the tradi tional Catholic Church and were features that appealed to Brazil's rap idly growing urban population. Nakamaki also mentions actual cases of people who talked of the appeal of the teaching that responsibility for one's good or bad fortune rests with oneself， or the appeal of the teach ing that labor freely and gladly rendered ultimately redounds to one's own happiness. Practical ethics that include the utilitarian idea that ser vice ultimately brings happiness reveals particularly well the character istic feature of ethics in the New Religions (see F u j i i 1990， pp. 236-44, and S h i m a z o n o 1991b).
Explaining the appeal of PL in terms of its miracle beliefs and practi cal urban ethics would also apply to most of the other groups that have succeeded in advancing into other cultures. Whether Brazil, or the United States of America, or Korea, or Thailand, cultural resources that were lacking in the traditional religious groups but abundantly available in Japan's New Religions appear here in their classic form. Only, in the case of PL, the manner of presenting the practical ethics is systematic and thoroughgoing, and herein lies the reason why it has had a greater appeal than the other groups. As Nakamaki explains, PI!s ethical guidance reaches out into the practical details of living in an exhaustive and min ute way. Another feature of its ethical statements, like those of Seicho no Ie, is that they pay careful attention to subtle shifts of mentality and present technical, mind-control-type methods for bringing about psy chological stability ( S h i m a z o n o 1988a, 1989b). Like the "new thought" and "positive thinking" that has been popular in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century, or the "human potential" movement of recent years, techniques for preserving mental stability in the midst of urban living, with its isolation and stressfulness, have been linked with ethical practice.
LO G IC A L STATEMENTS
What accounts for the appeal of Seicho no Ie and Sekai Kyuseikyo? They, too, stress miracle belief and preach practical ethics for living. In this respect they have something in common with PL. Yet they also have a slightly different appeal: their systematic, logical statements. The founder of Seicho no Ie, T^niguchi Masaharu, and the founder of Sekai Kyuseikyo, Okada Mokichi, both were culturally refined men blessed with a gift for writing discourse in a coherent way. In this they were both quite different from other founders. In the cases of female founders most at home in the world of oral tradition, or male founders lacking in literary knowledge, the words they left behind are not too logical, but what they want to say is conveyed through delicate nuances. This makes translation of their teachings extremely difficult Also, such religious groups tend to be averse to logical explanations of their teachings and to learning. Typical examples of this are the groups in the Reiyukai fam ily tree ( S h i m a z o n o 1988b). These groups are not suited for expansion to other cultures when one considers the importance of transmitting teachings in a readily understandable form. In contrast, Seicho no Ie and Sekai Kyuseikyo are able to draw non-Japanese to the world of their teachings through written expression that, while easy to understand, is logical and coherent, rather than a delicately nuanced mode of expres sion that is bound to one determinate culture.
In addition, I believe that Seicho no Ie's stress on the importance of members reading its literature is one of the very important points of its appeal. In present-day urban society, being proficient in written expres sion and having a habit of reading is an important condition for social success. As was true in Japan in the 1930s， in a society where urbaniza tion advances rapidly, religions that make positive use of easily compre hensible literature as a tool for propagation are, by that fact alone, already attractive. Also, if easy-to-read, easy-to-understand doctrinal liter ature is available in translation, the message can get across even w itho u t the mediation of close person-to-person contact. In propagation to peo ple of a different language, and in an age of cultural diversity, propaga tion that relies on the medium of literature that is not so bound by the delicate nuances of a specific culture is especially effective.12 A POSITIVE APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS PLURALISM W hat was said in the preceding section could almost be said about Soka Gakkai as well.13 But there is one important difference between Soka Gakkai and Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyuseikyo, and PL. This is the attitude towards other religions， especially the attitude towards the traditional religion dominant in the overseas country. Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyuseikyo, and PL take a positive attitude to the dominant traditional religion and allow their members to continue to belong to, for example， the Catholic Church. This attitude is based on the idea that all religions are in fact rooted in the same reality and seek the same thing. They preach that their religion and Christianity are not fundamentally different, but they are merely complementing and perfecting what was lacking in the earlier Christian religion. They therefore adopt a flexible policy of leaving such things as rites of passage to the Catholic Church. This line of thinking is readily accepted by people who have taken on traditional Catholic views and rites out of custom. Also, the adoption of such a generous attitude has the additional benefit that it avoids the troubles that arise when people with many ties to a traditional religion sever those ties to jo in these new religious groups.
Soka Gakkai, on the other hand, demands exclusive commitment. Its members must sever their relations with their traditional religion. This can be the cause of troubles with the traditional religious bodies, with relatives, and with neighbors. In this respect, Soka Gakkai can be de scribed as putting itself in a slightly unfavorable position.
Yet, seen from another perspective, these two types of groups have something in common: both assume the coexistence of diverse religions, both have prepared coherent statements for handling this situation and have prepared positive measures to cope with it.14 People in present-day society are placed in circumstances that make them keenly aware of the coexistence of diverse religions. For a person to choose one from among the different religions and be committed to it, something is needed that will convince the person. By insisting that other religions are wrong and that it is correct, Soka Gakkai is showing one type of a response to the pluralistic coexistence of religions. What this means is that Seicho no Ie, Sekai Kyuseikyo, and PL on the one hand, and Soka Gakkai on the other, are adopting differing approaches to a situation they all con sciously recognize, that of the coexistence of diverse religions.
I have attempted to explore the appeal ofjapanese New Religions to local residents by analyzing the features of those groups that have suc ceeded in expansion into other cultures. It is necessary, though, to con sider also the basic feature shared by all the New Religions of Japan, that of their being this-worldly oriented religions.15
To be this-worldly oriented first of all implies that a systematic con ception of salvation provides the framework for these religions of mag ical, this-worldly salvation. In Japan's New Religions, the healing of sick ness, harmony in the family, and success in one's work are directly linked to the highest goal of belief: salvation. Secondly, it means putting weight on self-help and effort in one's present life. This is closely con nected with the PL characteristic described earlier. An extremely large number ofjapanese New Religions do not preach reliance on the power of God, the power of Buddha, the power of this or that holy person, but preach that happiness cannot be attained unless one changes one's own mental attitude and manner of daily life. This-worldly orientation in the above two meanings is linked with an immanentist view of the divine that recognizes the divinity of the human being and recognizes divinity in existence in the present world in gen eral. These characteristics were lacking in traditional religions with their strong tendency to be affirmative with regard to the other world and negative toward this world. It is easy to understand why such thisworldly orientation and an immanentist view of the divine are attractive to people living in a competitive society where industrialization and ur banization have advanced and changes are extreme.
Cultural Discord Due to Expansion Overseas and Religious Unification
It has been reported many times that religious groups propagating their religion in other cultures have attempted to adapt themselves to the re spective alien cultures. PL, for example, takes a variety of steps to make their translations of documents readily understandable to the local peo ple. It has also been reported that they have also introduced elements that differ significantly from the way ceremonies and assemblies are con ducted in Japan (Na k a m a k i 1989, . Seicho no Ie is said to have omitted from its translation of Seimei no jisso and other documents pas sages that might encounter resistance from Brazilians. The NSA has also made repeated efforts to Americanize; one example is its "pioneer spirit" catch phrase in connection w ith its active involvem ent in the Bicente nary o f A m erican Independence (W il l ia m s 1989).
Apart from these attempts to adapt on the part of the religious groups themselves, there can be spontaneous changes made to the contents of teachings or practice by the non-Japanese members of the groups. Con sciously or unconsciously, local religious culture or local ways of group management can be introduced, leading to ways that differ from the parent body in Japan. I f steps are taken to ensure control by dint of force, discontent can arise among local believers, and this in turn can even lead to a splitting off of whole groups. While adaptations made by religious groups are done for the sake of more effective propagation, at the same time they can be viewed as strategies to control local believers within the framework of the larger group. This means that New Reli gions accepted by people of alien cultures have to face new problems of cultural discord and religious unification as a result of their adaptations.
Even within Japan itself it is not unusual for groups of believers in a particular religious organization to deviate from the regulation of the central body, or even split off entirely. Reiyukai and Sekai Kyuseikyo, for example, have seen large numbers of groups escape control of the central body, and some have branched off completely, and perhaps there are but few examples of medium-sized groups that could not be classified as branches from larger groups. In the case of groups overseas, it is probably even more difficult to maintain control, given the geo graphical and cultural distances separating them.
Deviation of overseas believer groups from the control of headquar ters in Japan already occurred in various places around the time of World War II as a result of loss of contact. In Brazil a group of Omoto followers that included a large number of non-Japanese was beginning to form from around 1930, but contact with Omoto headquarters ceased after government oppression of the group within Japan in 1935 ( M a e y a m a and S m i t h 1983). The group of believers in Brazil developed rather independently and began to engage in activities similar to those of such popular Brazilian religions as spiritism and Umbanda, After the war contact with headquarters was restored, and organizational affi liation was formally renewed, but the contents of its religious activities underwent no change; headquarters has done almost nothing to inter vene.
In the case of Tenrikyo in Taiwan, contact with headquarters was cut after the war, and the Chiaitungmen church, which was run solely by local believers, adopted poe (divination stones) and the drawing of lots to divine the right times to pray, the offering of gilt paper to gods and ancestors, and other elements of Chinese folk religion ( H u a n g 1989).
But with the resumption of operations of the Tenri propagation office in Taiwan in 1967, slowly but steadily, the church was restored to some thing similar to what exists in Japan. Still, it is said that some subordinate missionary stations even now maintain deviant elements. In Korea, where anti-Japanese feelings run high, problems of this sort are even more serious, and control by headquarters is a difficult matter, including the problem of church unity within Korea itself.
A recent example of discord occurred in Soka Gakkai's overseas orga nization. NSA (Soka Gakkai in the U.S.A.), which achieved explosive growth at the end of the 1960s, attempted to hand over leadership of the local organization to non-Japanese ( W i l l i a m s 1989). But the new lead ership stratum made up principally of non-Japanese did not like the central-administrative, organization-mobilizing nature of the group and attempted to adopt policies that set a value on the autonomous activities of regional groups and on democratic procedures for running NSA as a whole. This happened to coincide, however, with a sudden slowdown in NSA growth and even signs of decline. From the 1980s, under the guid ance of headquarters, there was a return to a central-administrative, or ganization-mobilizing type of religious group along with a return to a leadership setup in which Japanese formed the core. In the process, a group of people, mainly whites who for a time had been in leadership positions, separated and began independent activities. While detailed information is not available, a similar large-scale secession also has oc curred in Indonesia.
Judging from the experiences of groups splitting away from parent bodies within Japan, we can anticipate that the problem of regulating overseas believer groups will occur often in the future. There will no doubt be some groups in which the overseas believers will be numeri cally stronger. There is already a faction, the Shinsei-ha， within Sekai Kyuseikyo in Brazil, that is larger than its sponsoring body in Japan. Also, the sources of propagation activity have shifted in recent years with, for example, Brazilian members of Seicho no Ie and Sekai Kyuseikyo doing successful missionary work in Europe, or with a Ko rean member of Tenrikyo propagating in Argentina.16 At present, it ap pears that in most of the groups the authority ofjapanese propagators is preserved, but it is only a matter of time before local propagators will have more say. In the future, financial aid coming from headquarters will undoubtedly decrease when Japan's status as an economic super power begins to decline. When that happens, the question will surely arise, how will the central body in Japan be able to maintain control over religious bodies overseas? It is impossible to predict whether or not it will be able to maintain its present unity as a single multinational orga nization. New Religions that have expanded overseas can be compared to multinational enterprises, it has been argued, and they can be char acterized as multinational religions ( I n o u e 1985; N a k a m a k i 1989, 1986) ， but when separations occur overseas and a religion ceases to be a single organization, we shall have to think again about the appro priateness of this designation.
Significance from a History of Religions Perspective
The expansion o fja p a n 's New Religions into other cultures from the 1960s on was founded on the imperialist-inspired invasions before the war as well as massive migrations from Japan, which continued even after the war. Without these two factors there probably would not have been such an extensive expansion into other cultures. It is also clear that Japan's economic prosperity is another contributing factor to recent ex pansion into other cultures. The success of Sekai Kyuseikyo and Soka Gakkai in Thailand, for example, cannot be fully comprehended unless one takes into account the huge economic influence wielded by Japan ese businesses in the country and the financial and spiritual help liber ally poured into Thailand from Japan for the sake of propagation. In a certain sense, then, the expansion into alien cultures ofjapan's New Re ligions must be seen from one viewpoint as the fruit of the growth in economic and military influence of the Japanese.
Still, the expansion into alien cultures from the 1960s on also has to be grasped in the light of the rapid expansion in cultural exchange worldwide, with movements of personnel and information on the in crease. This is also linked with a spread of cultural tolerance. Societies that previously were closed to other religions have in the past twenty years become open to missionary activity. In years to come, places like the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China will no doubt be thrown open as markets where propagation can be freely conducted. We can ex pect that places for extensive activity will open anew to those religions in the world that favor propagation and evangelism, and that they will expand.
W hat sorts of religions will be active in these new markets and vying for results from missionary activity? There are four categories:
The most conspicuous cradles of these new religions have been the United States and Japan. The new religious groups originating in the United States are also often called "cults" ： the Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Scientology, etc. The Unification Church that was born in Korea is also powerful. The Wat Dhammakaya movement begun in the 1960s in Thailand is an example of a new religious movement with a high potential for spreading to other countries. Seen in a global perspec tive, Japan's New Religions have much in common with these religious groups and movements.
As I suggested above, Japan's New Religions have garnered great suc cess in societies where urban populations have increased as a result of industrialization. Again, in those societies where industrialization has al ready been attained and the loneliness of urban living has deepened, they are considered to have the potential for a certain degree of success in missionary activity. In such societies the New Religions try to indicate concrete, practical guidelines for overcoming the problems isolated in dividuals face in ordinary daily life. And they offer such people spiritual support for self-help and mutual-support communities. In doing this, they offer something people can hang on to as they acquire moral self discipline and continue to live as urban middle-class citizens. Further more, they have more this-world intentionality than sects， and they try to respond to urban residents' this-worldly aspirations.
In a world community characterized by increasing industrialization and urbanization, the demand for religions that fulfill such functions will probably increase. The various New Religions in Japan have, along side cults originating in the United States, been in the vanguard in var ious regions throughout the world, nurturing and storing up the cultural resources for meeting that demand.
